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This essay is concerned with debt-producing mechanisms that exist between the 
Turkish state and Kurdish citizens. Focusing on lawsuits known as “compensation 
recovery cases” (rücu tazminat davaları), I argue that the Turkish state uses the legal 
devices to transform reparative justice mechanisms into debt-producing mechanisms 
that create new compulsory bonds between the state and Kurdish citizens. Here, 
debt refers to the material and intangible relationship that the Turkish state has 
established with Kurdish citizens through which militaristic state violence 
transforms itself into forms of dispossession. Through this process, Kurdish citizens 
come to be haunted by repression in both the space of loss and reiterated violence 
and the space of (un)anticipated debt. What does it mean to imagine loss as debt? 
Who is indebted to whom? In this current context of extreme violence that could 
result in the death of all of the subjects living under curfew, how can we talk about 
debt as a type of relationship between the state and the Kurds? How does living in 
debt blur the boundaries between the violence of the present and the future? 
The military conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – “PKK”) spans three decades. It has claimed the 
lives of more than 45,000 civilians, militants and soldiers, resulted in thousands of 
casualties and disappearances, led to the forced evacuation of nearly 4,000 villages 
and towns, and caused the displacement of millions of people as well as the 
formation of ethnic, social and political enclaves in contemporary Turkey.1 
Following the unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK, which was triggered by the 
arrest of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, the state sought to capture the effect of 
violence and harness the political and moral values of Kurdish citizens. In an effort 
to control the sphere occupied by the PKK under the surveillance of transnational 
organisations such as the European Union, the state produced contradictory policies. 
These ranged from the enactment of reforms aimed at introducing democratisation, 
rehabilitation and reparation to military operations and serial acts of legal repression 
including the imprisonment of human rights activists and political militants aligned 
with the pro-Kurdish party. In the post-1999 period, the state never explicitly 
acknowledged its violent practices under emergency law. Nor did it offer an official 
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apology for economic and moral injuries that had devastating effects, particularly on 
the lives of Kurdish citizens. There was no attempt to establish a political and social 
mechanism for revealing the “truth” and identifying the perpetrators and victims of 
the 1990s. Instead, the state eluded accountability for violations of citizenship rights 
by crafting legal devices that would respond to claims of material damages and 
losses under the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)2 
In 2004, the Turkish parliament passed the “Law no: 5233 on Compensation for 
Losses resulting from Terrorism and the Fight Against Terrorism”. The law was 
designed to compensate citizens who had incurred material damages as a result of 
the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces between 1987 and 2004. 
The compensation law applied to all civilians except for those who had been 
convicted under the Anti-Terror Law because, by legal implication, their alleged acts 
of terror were presumably the cause of the damages and losses in question. In 
addition, damages that had previously been covered through monetary or other 
forms of aid granted to returnees were deducted from the award, and damages 
already covered by decision of the ECHR could not be addressed under the new 
legislation.3 
Compensation was awarded by mutual agreement between the applicants and the 
provincial committees (known as Damage Assessment Commissions), which were 
staffed by local public officials and the governor of the province in the conflict zone. 
Through these ‘friendly settlements’ (sulhname), applicants were awarded 
compensation in exchange for renouncing their right to litigation. As stated in the 
preamble, the compensation law was not derived from the recognition of the 
accountability of the state, but rather, from the “doctrine of social risk based on the 
objective responsibility of the state.”4 People who had suffered damages were 
compensated as a “requirement of justice and of the principles of a social state based 
on the rule of law”5 regardless of whether the state was accountable. They would not 
have to pursue the cases through litigation. The Damage Assessment Commissions 
were tasked with reaching friendly settlements for the claimed damages and, in so 
doing, were expected to reduce the number of cases carried to the ECHR and thus 
“prevent the use of compensation as a means of unjust enrichment.”6 
Based on these political and economic expectations, in 2006 the government sent a 
report on the applications made under the Compensation Law from people who had 
filed cases with the ECHR. Evaluating the mechanisms and results of these 
assessments, the ECHR ruled that the Compensation Law provided an effective 
domestic remedy and that applicants must exhaust these procedures before filing 
action in Strasbourg, The ECHR then returned all pending cases.7 
The Compensation Law thus became an effective tool for re-establishing the 
credibility of the Turkish state in the international arena.8 The state reconciled with 
global standards of accountability and created internal mechanisms designed to cut 
off access to international institutions of justice. The Compensation Law helped 
justify the legitimacy of the state and shut out the possibility of making claims about 
state terror and demanding retributive justice.9 The majority of the Kurdish 
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applicants agreed to sign the friendly settlements with the state and renounced their 
right to litigation, which means that they consented to the legal closure of their files 
with respect to the injuries that they suffered under emergency rule between 1987 
and 2004. They often did not perceive the settlements to be compensation for past 
injuries and injustices. Instead, they viewed the process as another form of charity, 
which was historically and politically a familiar mode of interaction with the state.10 
The process for applying for compensation for the injuries suffered between 1987 
and 2004 ended in 2008. However, the Compensation Law remained the sole legal 
instrument for providing reparations for all future material damages resulting from 
“terrorism” and the “fight against terrorism.” After 2004, members of the military 
and the police, village guards, and civilians who suffered material and intangible 
damages would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Compensation Law 
and submit petitions to the Damage Assessment Commissions instead of taking the 
matters to court. 
There was also a second form of compensation that underpinned the relationship 
between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens. It was known as compensation 
recovery cases (rücu tazminat davalan). These cases involved compensation paid by 
the state to the members of the military and the police for injuries and losses 
incurred during the fight against the PKK beginning in the 1990s. These transactions 
have never fully settled the matters in question, but instead have led to a new cycle 
of litigation in which the Ministry of Defence or Interior Affairs as the payee of the 
compensation sues the other party in the conflict, in this context, the pro-Kurdish 
party activists and/or the PKK guerrilla fighters, in order to recover the 
compensation that the state had paid to a member of the military or the police 
and/or their families. 
These cases were not grounded in special articles of the Anti-Terror Law or the 
Compensation Law. The right to litigation for compensation recovery was instead 
based on Article 41 of the Law of Obligations (Borçlar Hukuku), which states: “A 
person who wrongfully harms another intentionally, negligently or imprudently is 
under the obligation to compensate the other party for this harm.” This provision is 
mostly used by insurance companies to recover any compensation they make to 
their policyholders from a third party when the responsibility of the third party has 
been proven. A classic example is a traffic accident in which the policyholder has 
little or no fault and the liability of a third party is established. The state adopts a 
similar logic. Acting like an insurance company, it uses this procedure to regulate its 
relationship with its citizens in cases concerning material and intangible damages 
incurred as a result of acts that were committed during political protests, marches 
and demonstrations. In the case of injured member of the military or the police, the 
state pays compensation to its staff members and then recovers it from third parties 
whose actions are proved to have caused the damage to public property and officers. 
The compensation recovery process is as follows: First, the ministry sends the file to 
the lawyers at the Treasury Department with accompanying information on the 
identities of the perpetrators allegedly involved in the incident against the Turkish 
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member of the military or the police officer. The lawyers investigate the financial 
situation of the accused person/people and document all of their assets. They then 
file a lawsuit with the Civil Court, where the accused is asked to cover the 
compensation that has been paid to military or police staff. The lawyers start the 
legal procedure prior to the final decision of the Criminal Court that determines the 
responsibility of the accused person for the claimed deeds. However, the final 
verdict of the Civil Court relies on the decision of the Criminal Court. Should the 
Criminal Court find the defendant responsible for the injury and penalise it, the Civil 
Court immediately finalises the case and forces the accused to make a payment to 
the Ministry. The payment is meant to include reimbursement for the compensation 
with interest and court expenses. The consecutive decisions of the Criminal and Civil 
Courts turn the accused into both a criminal and a debtor. His/her debt becomes an 
inclusive and inevitable part of his/her sentence. Yet the life of this debt is not 
contingent on the life of the militant. The debt stands even if the militant died at the 
scene of the incriminating event, or afterwards. 
His/her name remains on the list of responsible parties included in the file sent to 
lawyers by the Ministry. The fact that his/her responsibility for the alleged injury 
has not and cannot be investigated and judged at the Criminal Court does not block 
the Ministry’s request to file a compensation recovery claim. While the decision on 
the criminal responsibility of the dead militant for the act is put on hold, the state 
uses the civil law to perpetuate the crime-punishment-debt relationship: it forces the 
militant’s family to take responsibility for their child’s deeds. Following the orders of 
the ministry, state lawyers track the heirs of the militant and bring a lawsuit against 
them in the Civil Court, seeking repayment of the lingering debt, which would 
amount to the recovery of the compensation paid by the state to the members of the 
military or the police. 
According to human rights lawyers, despite the complicated implications of these 
practices, the state is not breaking the law. Rather, in the absence of the accused 
militant, the state circumvents the general principle of the criminal law (ceza hukuku) 
that stipulates the connection between the individual, the crime and the punishment, 
and instead justifies its claim on the basis of the inheritance law (miras hukuku), 
which rules that heirs inherit both assets and liabilities, including the debt of the 
deceased. The liability for the debt is what made them subject to the verdict of the 
Civil Court (hukuk mahkemesi) for the reimbursement of the compensation. Through 
compensation recovery cases, the state has been using the force of the law to redefine 
the connection between the families and the dead militant, between the heirs and the 
corpse, and to craft forced ties through the legally invented relationship of 
indebtedness. In this context, the families of Kurdish guerrillas are imprisoned by 
debt until they find the means to pay to the state. 
This confinement has neither spatial nor temporal limits. Once these files are opened 
by state lawyers, they remain open until the debt is paid. The state generates 
urgency around the recovery of the compensation paid to the members of the 
military or the police by requiring state lawyers to bring these cases to the court 
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within one year of receiving the files from the ministry. Should the lawyers miss the 
deadline, they fall into the status of debtors and are themselves held liable for the 
damages. Despite the pressure applied by the state, compensation recovery cases 
take a long time to close. Reaching the families can be difficult because they tend to 
be scattered or settled outside of Turkey. Some do not register their current address. 
The trials often take place without the presence of the family members. State lawyers 
appear in court as claimants representing the ministry, and most families are not 
notified. They often learn about the debt only upon receipt of a letter containing the 
terms of the final verdict, which can come years after the death of their children. The 
closure of the cases can also be delayed due to the continuous deferral of the final 
verdict by judges who avoid making decisions that go against the will of the state, 
leaving the case in limbo for an unlimited period of time. In the interim, the parents 
of the dead militant might pass away and in turn leave younger members of the 
family liable. Their inheritance includes both the memory of past violence and the 
future debt of siblings who died in the war against the state. 
Upon receiving the final verdict, the families can choose to follow one of two paths. 
First, they are advised to apply for the renunciation of inheritance (reddi miras), 
which involves disclaiming their legal connection to their children and hence the 
obligation to inherit their debt. This route has a temporal constraint, as the 
renunciation can only be done within a certain period of time after the death of the 
person. More significantly, the families often feel divided between the urgency to 
escape the heavy burden of the debt and the desire to remain loyal to the memory of 
their children. They are also informed that they have a right to appeal the decision of 
the Civil Court to the Supreme Court. Such appeals can be based on a lack of the 
evidence of the injuries and the alleged crime/fault of the dead militant. If their 
appeal is refused, they are forced to pay the debt including court fees, the 
compensation paid to the members of the military/police or their families, and the 
interest that accumulated starting on the day that the transaction between the state 
and the injured families was initiated. If the family does not have assets or other 
financial means that can be appropriated, they are given the status of “aciz” (not 
able). Even this status as someone who does not own property does not exempt 
them from the debt. The file is never closed. The debt does not vanish. It lingers 
behind the scenes, continues living and breathing in the files and inhabits the past, 
present and future of the family as the material ghost of protracted violence. 
The ministry requires its lawyers to return to the file every five years and re-
investigate the financial conditions of the “aciz” to see whether the family members 
have accumulated any means that could be confiscated in order to settle the debt. 
The lawyers follow orders. Before they move to their next post, they leave notes in 
the folders reminding their successors of the timeline to be followed in order to 
reactivate the process of hunting down the debtors. As the gatekeepers of the law, 
state lawyers continue to wait for the re-emergence of the debtor. 
The implicit suggestion of the foregoing discussion is that the analysis of state 
violence in Turkey requires looking into legal practices related to the political 
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economy of conflict, which in turn involves revisiting the relationship between loss, 
compensation and debt. Through the implementation of the Compensation Law and 
compensation recovery cases, the state has effectively operated as if it were an 
insurance company, generating new forms and domains of debt-producing 
management and creating its own internal mechanisms of investment in death. This 
mode of compensation/debt economy has served the re-distributive logic of the neo-
liberal state, which accumulates capital through dispossession, effectively continuing 
its war against the opposition by economic means.11 The state used the 
Compensation Law to dispossess those who had suffered losses during the conflict 
of the right to appeal to a transnational institution for justice. It also managed to 
standardise its own compensation system -at rates much lower than those used by 
the ECHR- and calculate the economic and political costs of death and life in the 
context of “the fight against terrorism.” This manoeuvre functioned as an effective 
way of reducing the official expenses spent by way of compensation and, as 
envisioned and stated in the preamble of the Compensation Law, to “prevent the 
sudden enrichment of the applicants” who filed claims to the ECHR. In this political 
context, the rule of recovery (rücu) has operated as a complementary practice, 
supporting the accumulation logic of the neo-liberal state that redistributes capital 
by converting the compensation paid to the members of the military and the police 
into the debt that would be paid by the Kurdish families of dead militants. 
David Graeber defines debt “as an exchange that has not been brought to 
completion.”12 Debt brings inequality into relationships and creates a forced bond 
between two parties. Yet, Graeber notes, “There is no such thing as a genuinely 
unpayable debt … we call it a ‘debt’ because it can be paid, equality can be restored, 
even if the cost may be death by lethal injection.”13 Maurizio Lazzarato makes a 
counter-argument stating that in contemporary capitalist societies, “Debt is a 
promise of repayment and therefore concerns open and indeterminate time, the 
radical uncertainty of the future which the logic of probabilities cannot anticipate or 
control.”14 With the formation of states, empires and monotheistic religions, 
Lazzarato argues, debt turns into life debt and becomes unpayable, and not 
reimbursable.15 The relationship between creditor and debtor is never settled and 
continuously reproduced as it “assures political domination and economic 
exploitation.”16 Hence, debt can never be paid through monetary reimbursement, 
but only as Walter Benjamin implied, through political redemption, notes 
Lazzarato.17 
Following Lazzarato’s critical analysis, I argue that the debt that the families in these 
cases are made to pay is also unpayable. It is not reimbursable. Using the rule of 
recovery (rücu), the state produces legal violence that mortgages the past, present 
and future of the families. The state uses the relationship of indebtedness to disclaim 
its responsibility for the loss of lives and to pass the cost of that violence onto its 
opponents. Legal violence seeks to transform all losses into material transactions 
between debtors and creditors. It establishes the families as subjects who are 
accountable for the pain and losses that they suffer and forces them to take 
responsibility for actions that are not their doing. While the Compensation Law 
Theory & Event, Volume 19, Issue 1, January 2016 
   P a g e  7  
 
justifies the monopoly of the state to execute and then repair the effects of violence, 
punishment through compensation recovery instils guilt and fear through a 
relationship of indebtedness. While the Compensation Law erases the accountability 
of the state and sets the rule of the friendly settlement in exchange for the 
renunciation of the right to litigation, the compensation recovery cases create an 
unmovable and permanent relation between the state and families of the dead 
militant as the inheritors of punishment in the form of debt. 
The state uses law and debt to channel the force of the past on the present and future 
and redefine the limits and form of continuity and responsibility between citizens 
and generations. In this context, neither the local governors nor the members of the 
military/police were imprisoned for violent acts that caused the destruction of the 
environment and lives of Kurdish citizens. Nor were their families held responsible 
for the compensation paid to the Kurdish citizens who applied for and received 
compensation in exchange of the loss that they incurred during the conflict. Only 
Kurdish citizens were held responsible for the acts of their older and younger 
relatives and held liable for the recovery of any compensation that was paid. 
The bodies of dead militants were often not returned to the families; they either 
disappeared or were buried by PKK militants or the Armed Forces in unknown 
locations. Families received the news of the deaths of their children through PKK 
networks and channels or an official letter from the government that registered and 
certified the death. These families were forced to continue their lives suspended 
between mourning for their loss and melancholia for the absence of the grave. Even 
though the person responsible for the action was absent, and even in cases in which 
no body was made available for burial, the state used the rule of inheritance and 
recovery to define what would live on from that incident and what would haunt the 
people who were left behind. As the rule of inheritance became the key component 
of this forced contract, its renunciation became the only clear path to escape the 
obligation of this bond. In other words, the erasure of the legal debt was conditioned 
on the parent’s renunciation of their bond with their child. The debtor-creditor 
relationship would be voided through the legal dissolution of the parent-child 
relationship. The state was offering another opportunity for closure by forcing the 
families to disown their children, which would in turn mean disowning their 
connections to themselves. 
The war in Turkey grows bigger and bitterer everyday. The crossfire between the 
state’s vengeance of sovereign violence and the Kurdish militants’ claim to self-
governance and self-defence kills people from different generations who happen to 
be witnesses, agents, activists, residents, new-borns and passers-by in the region. It 
generates more ditches, barricades and hence more wreckage and ruins as evidence 
of the destruction of lives. In the meantime, the possibility of justice and 
reconciliation decreases and evidence of material losses accumulates. This will soon 
produce claims for compensation for some and debt for others, haunting both the 
present and the future. 
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